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This paper examines music notations using the comparative analysis of 
a taxonomical model, grounded in theories of practice from John Willats, 
and Nelson Goodman. In other classifications that include the robust 
Western staff notation, for an example, such drawings have been 
insufficiently explained, sometimes subsumed into categories of 
diagram, or at best thrown down as a kind of hub, vaguely associated 
with an unwieldy number of relations. In this paper, conclusive 
assessments will made of the relationship between music notations and 
other drawing systems, in which the reader will see that they are hybrid 
representation systems, mapping to and from a conjunctive space-time 
of performance, with characteristics of all of writing, pictorial and 
denotative drawing. 
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ON NOT DEFINING DRAWING 
The painter Stephen Farthing recently produced an admirably stoic working definition of 
drawing, as the translation of ‘multidimensional events that may or may not physically 
exist, into readable two dimensional matter’ (2011, p.2). This is a generalised definition in 
a context where expanding collections of information and representation of data sets from 
industrial, financial, medical, and communication technologies all have taken advantage of 
the efficiencies of computational systems for organisation and search. Our cognitive 
inclinations have certainly asserted themselves in the ways that we sort and search such 
systems, re-forming heterogeneous databases to a kind of legibility through graphical 
representations in the form of bitmap prosthetics that pan and zoom, or trees and webs -- 
metaphorical tricks, grounded in physical knowledge. And while his definition discounts 
without disregarding material aspects of drawing, the limitation to two-dimensions in 
Farthing’s reduction might be an inessential result of familiar observations that ends up 
excluding quite a bit in potential (see the public drawings of Felice Varini, for a vexing 
example). For all that, his simplicity is useful in a context where questions of technique, 
distribution and pedagogy are complicated by computational systems. More stirring in its 
language, perhaps, are the art-historian Erika Naginski’s remarks on ‘the dynamic collision 
of hand and mind to which (drawing) continually bears witness’ (2000, p.79). This is a 
literary take compared to the other more pragmatic one, but it says something essentially 
similar: rather than any mere artefact or implementation, what is in (a) drawing is 
evidentiary, but also an interaction. 
The task of making any definitive statement on drawing -- something so thoroughly 
embedded in culture and what it means to be human through pictures, diagrams and 
writing -- is a tricky proposition. In this paper I argue that a taxonomical approach 
circumvents the failure of words, allowing us to see drawing as a field: not some thing in 
need of definitive explanation, but engagements better determined than defined, and 
satisfactorily expressed only in admission of its abundance. We could begin the task of not 
defining drawing, then, simply by acknowledging the problems inherent in any summary 
portrait of that abundance: Drawing is a thinking practice, and definition is impossible, due 
to the unfinished nature of our perceptions in the inscription. 
Supporting the perspective of a 21st century fine artist with an interest in the interrogation 
of conventions, I have reviewed literature from communities investigating its uses in 
creativity, pedagogy and communication, seeking to determine its roles in cognition, and as 
support for ideation as an extension. My classification model was motivated by a selection 
(not exhaustive, but representative) of others that examine practices of design drawing, 
diagrams, and the mongrel interests of the fine artist, interrogating them for dominant and 
useful themes. I reviewed research stressing social context, author function (is it 
informative or speculative?), and characteristic codes (is it digital or analog; is it indexical, 
iconic, symbolic?). I read reports of computational and A.I. inspired research, and design-






























related research into questions of production and consumption, supplemented by the 
experiential knowledge and reflections of the fine-art drawing practitioner working, so to 
speak, in intersections. In that spirit, the ontology inclined towards structural aspects – 
how we organise for legibility, rather than functional or social aspects. This bias reflects the 
expectation that realising the abundance of drawing will come by taking seriously the 
implications of our enormously long history of engagement with its practices, foregrounding 
cognitive values, rather than some aspect of artefactual status. Minimising cultural 
contingencies has incidentally had the heartening effect of bringing together Lascaux and 
the virtual studio as sites in which we draw, rather than conceiving their differences in 
terms of rupture.  
More specifically, in previous classifications where the common Western staff notation is 
included (hereafter referred to as the CMN), familiar to composers and students of music 
for nearly a millennium, that system is insufficiently explicated, subsumed into categories 
of diagram, or at best thrown down as a kind of hub, and vaguely associated with an 
unwieldy number of relations, as in Farthings’ “Plan de dessin” (2006). The objectives of 
my model, differentiating it from other taxonomies, were: 
a) A closer inspection of music notations, qua drawing, to show its relationships to 
other drawing systems.  
b) To decentralise specific modes in favour of a multi-disciplinary view appropriate to 
the persistence of its subject as a strategic, executive practice rooted farther back 
in our history than we can clearly see, and bearing fruit across multiple domains of 
knowledge.  
 
Description and depiction 
Between the extremes of pure mathematical theory and life-size working models lie 
abstract and concrete words, diagrams, maps, drawings, pictures, photographs, 
sculptures, film and so on (Fish and Scrivener, 1990, p.118).  
Nelson Goodman’s notation theory (1976) and John Willats’ analytics (1997) were 
identified as key points of reference in this project. Goodman’s work is an essential starting 
point for a range of disciplines concerned with symbolic communication, even for those 
that diverge from its conclusions. Under his rubric, an articulate notation scheme must 
support consistent, repeatable interpretation and performance, and he offers the CMN as 
our flawed, pragmatic best. I will not give a full account of the philosopher’s notation 
theory, but as an exercise in understanding his essential distinction between “dense” and 
“articulate” systems, Goodman asks us to consider two primarily linear images: an 
electrocardiogram, and a Hokusai drawing of Mount Fujiyama (1976, p.229). While specific 
lines in each image may resemble each other, tracking across surfaces, they are deployed 






























in schemes with different objectives, and thus stand for different motivations. What 
matters in the diagrammatic line is the path it traces through its data field. Contingencies 
such as line weight or color are irrelevant: the image is a readout. To change qualities of its 
appearance would not affect its meaning. In contrast, in Hokusai none of these 
contingencies are irrelevant, all are at play. A pictorial representation is syntactically and 
semantically dense. Any mark in its field may be freely interpreted in significance, 
conceivably endless in routes of reference, and therefore, in Goodman’s terminology, 
replete. 
Thus in 20th century graphical music notations, such as those in John Cage’s seminal book 
“Notations” (1969), stable readings as performative design are simply impossible. This is 
not to say that they cannot function as scores, merely that there are degrees between 
poles of articulation, and those degrees have real effects on legibility. It is because of its 
simple graphic conventions and visual geometry that the CMN has persisted, even in a 
music culture which accepts the noise, silence, and the indeterminacy of contemporary 
compositional practices.  
Goodman lays out his notation theory as an effective division into branches of pictures, 
notations, and text. But however useful, once such categorisations are proposed the task 
of distinguishing between examples proves problematic. There is the habitual description–
depiction dichotomy, of course, but in the task of making an adequate classification 
scheme for the leaky abundance of drawing, I argue they are too dichotomous to be useful. 
Any of us who have seriously engaged with drawings understands they are prodigal things, 
read and misread, broken down in consumption, which Deanna Petherbridge deems a 
necessary and useful condition (2010, p.13). Therefore, I carry forward an argument in 
Willats for a binary organisation into the Drawing and Denotation systems.  
Keeping his focus on the page, Willats gives us an artefactually oriented model, and a 
stronger footing for classification because of the implications of necessity tied to systems 
of practice. Briefly, we use the Drawing systems to generate view-centred representations, 
‘putting things where they go, (mapping) spatial relations in the scene into corresponding 
relations in the picture’ (1997, p.2). In contrast, the Denotation systems correlate between 
perceived systemic relations and the drawing. As opposed to the sketch practice, where 
marks coalesce and break, inference is constrained in denotative drawings by analytical 
and informative motivations (1997, p.4). The author notes their underlying geometry as 
‘based on the most elementary and general types of spatial properties, which include 
relations like touching, separation, spatial order, and enclosure’ (1997, p.13). The 
differences between pictures and diagrams (or space and time), are thereby seen to be 
based on distinct marking-up approaches, accounting for questions of style as something 
other than mere socially novel praxes.  
 































If worlds are as much made as found, so also knowing is as much remaking as 
reporting (Goodman, 1975, p.72). 
Timothy Ingold writes that while a drawn line may work to circumscribe some shape, its 
tracery primarily represents the ‘movement of becoming’ (2010, p.18). In related terms, 
knowledge-representation diagrams target difference and emergence (Pope, 1986), also 
generally the subject of graphic-geometrical discourses. Stephen Pinker (in Lehrdal, 2003, 
p.271) considers “entity and relation” as central conceptual metaphors in verbal 
languages, also conspicuous in the vital impurity of the sketch – the very embodiment of 
Ingold’s movement of becoming, and therefore embedded in the socially charged 
engagements of life-drawing, where we reach across studio spaces to touch a comrade 
with a stick of dirt. And we can listen to them, the musicologist Lehrdal suggests (2003), in 
the symbolic language of music, reminding us that geometrical proofs and the tally-sheet of 
a music notation are both methods of understanding transformation and performance.  
Taxonomies of graphics and drawing have thus understandably tended towards domain-
specificity. Lohse (et al, 1991), for example, is a widely cited paper describing five types of 
technical diagrams (tables, maps, diagrams, networks, icons) arrived at through user group 
studies, not the progressive dialectics of Schenk’s (2007) or Lawson’s (1994) studies of 
graphical interactions between designer, team, and client, but efficacy assessments by 
users, at the point of consumption. And much of the recent literature on design-drawing 
converges on its ideational benefits as dialogues with materials, experience, and objective, 
in a more or less targeted search. In this, Tversky writes that drawing is ‘a cognitive tool 
developed to facilitate information processing… reflecting conceptualisations, not 
perceptions’ (1999, p.1). In 1735, for instance, the mathematician Leonard Euler resolved 
the problem of whether a route could be plotted crossing each of the town of Königsberg’s 
seven bridges only once. His (negative) solution demonstrated the simplest of mark-making 
strategies as a thinking tool, and on the entailments of Euler’s achievement, the graphics 
theorist Edward R. Tufte wrote: ‘Often the most effective way to describe, explore and 
summarise a set of numbers – even a very large set – is to look at pictures of those 
numbers’ (2001, p.9).  
Goodman further argues that the robustness of symbolic languages is related to the 
efficacy of its expressions in task fulfillment; in the title of an early chapter in Tufte’s 
influential volume on data graphics (“Graphical excellence,” 2001, pp.13-52), it is clear the 
author’s use of “excellence” conforms to Goodman’s efficacy. Indeed, the five principles of 
Tufte’s data graphics theory are entirely based on economy, and as printed, they also 
beautifully express the very theory they describe (2001, p.105). 
 






























Above all else show the data. 
Maximise the data-ink ratio. 
Erase non-data ink. 
Erase redundant data ink. 
Revise and edit. 
 
In the Königsberg bridges problem, which manages both largeness and smallness of 
scales, Euler developed a schematic, metonymic restructuring of a logical problem, for 
fruitful application beyond the merely theoretical. He did not actually cross the bridges, but 
used aspects of their relations to resolve questions of connectivity. The simplest of 
denotative drawings in Willats’ analysis, such an external representation is itself a 
classification exercise, a paring away of the intractable that supports Goodman’s 
perception that notation and digitality are kin.  
 
Metric drawing 
Billions of galaxies are never bigger, when they are counted, than nanometer-sized 
chromosomes; international trade is never much bigger than mesons… (Latour, 
1986, p.20). 
My reading of Goodman and Willats suggests a third class of drawing in addition to 
Projection and Topology, which will be called Metric, encompassing relational diagrams and 
systematic notations with time-factored and -factoring activity spaces: notations such as 
the CMN and the Laban movement notation.  
As a practice of thinking over external representations, the poet Paul Valéry suggests that 
the writer’s work is not a mere application of words to thoughts, but a synthetic symbolic 
tuning, in which there can be no optimal meaning dredged from a text (Tamplin, 1976, 
p.812). This principle also applies to the re-actions of the reader, diving into language, as 
Michel Serres has written, ‘as if lost,’ and then drawing through form and meaning, 
presumably to find some surface (in Scheher [tr.], 1983, p.53). It is a process comparable 
to views of translation, or indeed the work of the sketch, as dialogical work: an operation 
between languages, but also within a language, or a language-user.  
Like Latour’s mediated scale shift in the excerpt above from one impossibility to another, 
acts of translation allow us to span the ‘”gap between a hypothetical perfect language and 






























the concreteness of a living language”’ (Ricoeur, in Kearney, 2007, p.152). And as Latour 
suggests, this thinking over the representation can equalise discrepancies, or bridge a 
vague notion to the tangibility of performance, scaling incomprehensibilities to the handfuls 
and footfalls of our limited mental spaces. 
In reading an inscription, we draw on contextual knowledge and the presence of 
perceptible attributes relating to distribution, regularity, and detail, and decide how to 
approach the thing – say, a tree; then we diagnose/attribute/extract provisional meanings. 
We might recover the inscription’s character in terms of a tree-picture (with some aspect of 
resemblance to the organism, a modal representation, with attributes specified in the 
display), or a tree-diagram (emphasising logical relations, amodal representations of 
connectivity and sequence), or as an arbitrary symbolic conveyance for the tree-concept 
(Peirce, 1942, p.114). The nature of our abilities to make such decisions cannot be 
examined in detail here, but in a taxonomical context, putting aside the affordances and 
unruly potencies in the reading game, I argue with Willats that we ground our search for 
salience in the inscription in its construction.  
In drawing, of course, production and potential are only separable in theory. In the practice, 
the representational, communicative, and instrumental roles go on together. The creative 
underspecification of sketching is an example of such a unified structural-functional 
enterprise. While it may be called an “unstructured” approach, this is wrong: the sketch is a 
search through structuring. It is as much building as finding.  
 
Space and time inscriptions 
The very idea (of Algebra) is that it presents formulae which can be manipulated, 
and that by observing the effects of such manipulation we find properties not to be 
otherwise discerned’ (Peirce, 1885, p.182) 
As a preparatory and executive operation, we draw: sketching, depicting, describing, 
mapping, showing, or saying. The markings supporting all of these, as practices, are more 
or less projective or denotative, in Willats’ or Euler’s terms, emphasising attributes or 
relations. Informed by the disposition of this taxonomy, an additional class of Metric 
Drawing is proposed: relational diagrams, systems of systems, each species of which uses 
some admixture of diagrammatic reasoning, iconicity, and the quasi-pictorial nature of 
character-strings (Elkins, 1999, pp.135-137) in order to map a space of time.  
Again, Willats defines projective drawing as the mapping of ‘spatial relations in the scene 
into corresponding relations in the picture,’ and denotational drawing as the mapping of 
‘scene primitives onto corresponding picture primitives’ (Willats, 1997, pp.2-4). But 
drawings like the CMN are oriented both into and out of the frame of the inscription, with 






























both an embedded and an external key. Such notations address explicitly temporal events, 
factoring between axes as a dynamic system, and generating a readout. Thus they are 
sufficiently differentiated from the parsimonious diagrams of Euler, the way-finding of 
maps, the ambiguities of text or underspecified drawing systems -- not because these 
inscriptive practices are not in some ways temporal, but because time is not a character, so 
to speak, in their schemes.  
All things are both spatial and temporal, in the sense that W. J. T. Mitchell indicates (1986, 
p.103), but in making a tree inscription we do not target temporal dimensions of the tree, 
except as interpretive content, or perhaps as time-factored sequences in diagram. Even 
Duchamp’s strangely lucid “Nude Descending a Staircase” (1912) can only suggest 
through inscribed metaphors of fanning lines, tonal transitions, repetition, and 
diagrammatic directions of across and down. But metric notations, factoring movement, 
have additional concrete instructional motivations, and thus have a compositional, future-
subjunctive tense (see Petherbridge, in Garner [ed.], 2008, p.37). They do not simply map 
from scene or sequence to surface, but work in a conjunctive dimension of performance: 
they are space-time notations. This is not the tracing of semblance or distribution, as in our 
other tree-inscriptions, but of reaching for communicable correspondences between 
differently orienting experiences.  
In order to speak across perceptual modes, Forceville (in Gibbs [ed.], 2008, pp.462-482) 
suggests that we need engagements between (at least) two sign systems. As Latour has 
suggested, such engagements are made, the in-betweens bridged, translations cobbled 
together, through systematising notations which regulate the cognitive tool of drawing. 
Goodman, of course, predicates his notation theory on community obligations achieved 
through increasing articulation, attenuating noise to achieve signal. The CMN permits us to 
map pulses onto picture primitives, onto the page, then away again, remade into music. 
Similarly, the Labanotation encourages calculations of sinew, breath, and reveries on those 
onto the page, rendering leftward motions of the hand as characters for computation in 
both virtual and actual spaces of activity.  
Tufte discusses what he calls narrative graphics of space and time, and relational graphics 
as methods to plot, present, and understand complex multi-dimensional data. Tufte 
suggests their benefit is that ‘any variable quantity could be placed in relationship to any 
other variable quantity, measured for the same units of observation’ (2001, p.46). He in 
fact refers to relational graphics as the “greatest” of all graphics because of this insight 
generating utility, which permits possible causal relationships to be grounded in a present 
of plotted variables, allowing us see the rate of evaporation of water relative to some 
objective schema, or the relationship between thermal conductivity and temperature in 
copper, or to compare employment and inflation, or even to calculate expressions of fear 
and rage as social behaviours.  






























No thing can actually be reduced to number or mere order, suggests Serres, except as 
input into a systematic operation, in some process of translation. The productive, inscribed 
work of the composer or the choreographer is never accountable as a merely statistical 
operation, but their graphic inscriptions take advantage of the same aspects of marking up 
that the generalisations of the Euclidean space of the page offers the geometer. ‘The 
advantage gained in utilizing notational systems is clear,’ writes James Blachowitz, ‘we can 
manipulate them with greater accuracy and efficiency than analog models would allow; that 
is, we can calculate with them’ (1997, p.13). The pulses of music are not things that can 
be explicitly pictured or even distributions that can be denoted. Thus, such a 
representational complex cannot simply label or concatenate, it must behave like a control 
interface -- a surface of exchange between experience, sign-system, and user. Like Valéry’s 
translator-poet, we must be enabled to constitute searches for form.  
A Metric drawing is therefore a control interface; not a mere mapping to the page, as in 
projective or topological drawings, but a blending space with multimodal objectives, always 
about passage through a conjunctive space of time. Metric drawings allow us to hold the 
moon in hand, or mesons, or the pulses of the body, finally to construct bridges and 
arguments from their evanescence. And while we may never adequately define music, or 
grasp the entirety of the arguments, we may nonetheless draw them out, to grasp 
something more of ourselves.  
But systematic notations are flawed. They work (we work them), but in their displacements 
from the things which they circle, they are frequently deemed even by users to have failed 
in their appointed tasks. They nonetheless exemplify drawing as a mechanism of creativity 
with which we can build bridges between symbolic languages.  
In aid of developing the idea of a Metric classifier in the taxonomy, I adopted the four 
measurement scales – nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio -- defined by S.S. Stevens in 
pursuit of an answer to the question of whether it is possible to measure human sensation 
(1946). Measurement can be defined as a rule-based assignment of numbers to objects or 
events (Marradi, 1990), and in the broader sense of applying symbolic characters to real 
things as proxies, this is itself a practice of discrimination and classification, where 
perceived correspondences between objects and counting systems are determined, 
resulting in representations which become plastic in Peirce’s sense.  
In this adoption, we concede that the CMN, as a crucial exemplar species, addresses 
inherently imprecise contexts which are likely not cleanly measureable (an unsatisfying 
response to Stevens’ motivating question). In drawing, a mark made is a multiplicity. 
Through marking we are made aware of the surface, and the ripples set in motion between 
the two, in the act. In any music notation, each mark has a correspondence relationship to 
some musical structure, giving up a measure of its instability in the visual domain while 
taking on some aspect of the problems of auditory representation. And while users of the 






























staff notation clearly seek to quiet the oscillations, experimentally inclined composers such 
as Cage depend upon the ontological instability of marks, seeking to orchestrate rather 
than distil the rippling: in loosening constraints, such composers supply menus, rather than 
proscriptions.  
While music notations have functions as documents of events and processes, their real 
importance -- what a score is for -- is to delineate a ‘relationship to the future’ (Hanoch-Roe, 
1997, p.146). They are drawings of spatiotemporal events acting as both input and 
readout mechanisms, directing our attention to future action. In their activity spaces, every 
mark is a character, every character has a behaviour, and their referents – those things 
being scored -- are rendered at once static and dynamic, both description and proposition. 
They are algorithmic, intervallic environments in which we represent transformations, 
contiguities or angles in projection, forces and dynamics, and distributions between the 
space of audition and the space of vision, with the value-added capability of being played-
back. In the play-back and -forward, quality and quantity are conflated, and we get a view 
beyond mere representation, towards production, invention and instruction.  
Finally, music notations are environments in which drawing, reading and writing rub up 
against each other, and from the friction we are enabled to compose our thoughts; failure, 
bad ciphering, and creative accounting are possible, but also the construction of something 
beautiful. Similarly, in navigating immensely complex calculation sets for the culture of 
dance, the Labanotation – a factoring of bodily action -- seeks to plot entities and relations 
by segmenting the dancer and aspect-characters of her movements into a vertical timeline, 
exploring isomorphic relations between phenomenal experience and organising marks. 
Marrying Willats to Goodman and Cage, the move from schema to convention in drawing 
permits expression, analysis, and annotation, permitting users to push the envelope of the 
domain of the notation: to score impossibilities. Such systems are not simply tools for doing 
a job, therefore, but mechanisms for determining how the job can be done.  
The mechanism of the music notation treats gestures of sound-production as cyphers, but 
in the paring away, a ‘hallmark of abstract thought’ (Blachowicz, 1997, p.62), Metric 
drawings facilitate the making of observation into utterance. Those utterances may be 
garbled by imprecise or incorrect readings (which might of course be a motivation, as in 
many 20th century graphic notations), but they are nonetheless time-machines which 
exploit drawing’s synthetic cognitive advantages to a productive, rather than merely 
reactive engagement.  
The metric-inscriptive act of a music notation transports the primary space of audition to 
the secondary space of marking, encoding for further passage. In its articulation it 
becomes a control interface between experience, sign system, and user, allowing both 
views and manipulations on the sum and substance of its art – in all cases, space and 






























time. Thus it is that in drawing we find our best opportunity to accomplish the 
measurement of sensation that Stevens would have us consider. 
 
The geometry of inscriptions 
…the circle of the proof is drawn, not imagined to be drawn… Thus, the action of the 
proof is literal, and the object of the proof must be the diagram itself, for it is only in 
the diagram that the acts of construction literally can be said to have taken place 
(Latour, citing Netz, 2008, p. 455). 
In a metric classification we are extending geometric analogies derived from Willats, but 
also a more generic view described by Latour, who notes the advantages of working over 
inscriptions, that in their two-dimensions we ‘merge (propositions) with geometry… (which) 
result is that we can work on paper with rulers and numbers, but still manipulate three-
dimensional objects “out there”’ (citing Ivins, in 1986, p.20). In these terms, we have noted 
elsewhere that both pictorialism and the written word in the West have been theorised to 
be derivative of our social compulsions to count and to document that counting (Griffin, 
2011, p.80). Denise Schmandt-Besserat has persuasively traced the evolution of 
systematised marking through artefactual tallies ‘developed to keep track of property, 
beginning with a simple one-mark one-piece of property relation, developing into numerals 
as tallies became cumbersome for large sums and calculations’ (in Tversky, 2001), 
resulting in the numeracy which has allowed us to use numbers as something other than 
mere tokens. The logic of the social inscription, James Elkins has written in response, 
becomes an ‘articulated continuum of signs so that (every marked surface) will have a 
measure of pictoriality and of writing’ (1998, p158).  
Music and music notations are both inscriptions, but while we sing the one -- conversing 
with singing and song -- with the other we orchestrate, nudge, or diminish, from a place of 
thought. Standing for silence, paper is a material surface on which we work, but as we seek 
to fold, crumple, etch or shape it, through the mediating influence of articulate, metric 
notations, the paper becomes a space of time. They are hybrid representational systems, in 
Recanati’s sense (2007, p.511), driven by the cognitive values of marking-up. They are 
mechanisms grounded on the entity-relation metaphor at play in all drawings, fashioning 
action and instruction, and applicable to anger, music, or leftward motions of the hand. 
Responding to a rhetorical question from John Cage about the relations between paper and 
music, then, I believe that music notations prove to be kind of calculus of the body, a 
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FIG.1: THE TAXONOMY: BUILDING ON WILLATS’ BINARY VIEW, AND GOODMAN’S NOTATION THEORY, THREE CLASSES OF DRAWING PRACTICE ARE IDENTIFIED: THE 
TOPOLOGICAL, AND PROJECTIVE (WILLATS, 1997), AND THE METRIC. THE TOPOLOGICAL AND PROJECTIVE CLASSES BRANCH INTO ORDERS THAT COMPLY WITH WILLATS’ 
USEFUL MODEL, WHILE THE METRIC CLASS BRANCHES INTO FOUR ORDERS, ORGANISING BASED ON S. S. STEVENS’ (1947) NOMINAL, ORDINAL, INTERVAL AND RATIO 
MEASUREMENT SCALES (GRIFFIN, 2011). 
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